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Abstract
Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments
and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions
should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences
in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and
real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral behavior and judgment. We found that
Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action
to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an
on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this
cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death.
Keywords: Chinese culture, cultural difference, fatalism, moral decision making, moral judgment, responsibility, Taoism,
trolley problem.
1 Introduction
In the classic version of the trolley problem (Thomson,
1985), a runaway trolley threatens to kill five men on the
track ahead. A bystander can save the five by switching a
lever to divert the trolley on to a side-track where one man
will be killed. Moral philosophers have the clear intuition
that it would be morally permissible to turn the trolley,
and this is a central test case in research on the question
of why it is sometimes permissible and sometimes imper-
missible to harm one person to save many (e.g., Kamm,
2007; Thomson, 1985). The problem has also been used
in psychological research into the processes underlying
moral judgments (e.g., Greene et al., 2009; Greene, Nys-
trom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Moore, Clark, &
Kane, 2008; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, &
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007).
Experimenters have found that the average participant’s
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responses agree with philosophers’ intuitions in this case
(e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Som-
merville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001).
Most trolley research has been done on people from the
West, but it is implicitly assumed that intuitions should
generalize and that moral psychology is universal. Ex-
plicit support for cultural universality has been provided
by Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail (2007), who
reported data from participants in 120 countries and who
explored the influence of nationality for every group that
was large enough to include. They tested for differences
in judgments between a version of the trolley problem in
which a passenger on a train can divert it on to a side-track
and a footbridge version in which a bystander can stop the
train by pushing a man off a footbridge into its path, an
action that far fewer respondents endorse. This difference
was replicated across Australian, Brazilian, Canadian, In-
dian, American, and British participants. However, these
cultures are all WEIRD (western, educated, industrial-
ized, rich, and democratic, in the terminology of Heinrich,
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), and if cultural differences
exist, they are more likely to be found between cultures
that differ more fundamentally. After decades of British
colonial rule, even India has a democratic system of gov-
ernment and has evolved largely westernized cultural and
educational institutions and practices. In a subsequent
study, Abarbanell and Hauser (2010) partially replicated
the trolley/footbridge difference in a small-scale, poorly
educated agrarian Mayan population.
But there are grounds for suspecting that Chinese cul-
ture, in particular, has features that may engender differ-
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ent responses to trolley problems. Some evidence sug-
gests that East-West cultural differences affect cognitive
processes (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), and
that these differences lead to differences in judgment and
decision-making (Weber & Morris, 2010) and in philo-
sophical intuitions (Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich,
2004; Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001). A cultural dif-
ference that is potentially very relevant to trolley problems
is Chinese fatalism—a cluster of beliefs, deeply rooted
in Chinese culture, according to which one should allow
events to run their natural course without active interfer-
ence (Bond, 1991; Eberhard, 1966; Kirkland, 2004; Pal-
sane & Lam, 1996). This tends to cause Chinese people,
more frequently than others, to attribute life events, in-
cluding misfortunes, to fate, and to desist from interfer-
ing with their progression (Bond, 1991; Palsane, & Lam,
1996).
Chinese and U.S. samples were compared by Moore,
Lee, Clark and Conway (2011), using 24 scenarios, trans-
lated into Chinese as well as English, “all of which in-
volved sacrificing one person to save multiple others from
death” (p. 190). No significant differences were found be-
tween the Chinese and U.S. participants in their ratings of
how “morally acceptable” different courses of action were
to save lives at the cost of others. Nor did Mikhail (2011)
find any difference in an experiment run in English, us-
ing Chinese immigrants to the US, which asked about the
“moral permissibility” of turning the trolley.
Ahlenius and Tännsjö (2012) found that only 52% of
Chinese agreed that it is “morally permissible” to flip the
switch in the classic trolley problem, as compared to 81%
of Americans and 63% of Russians who agree that the
agent “should” flip the switch. Their results are difficult
to interpret given that the Chinese translation was differ-
ent from the English and Russian language versions. Ahle-
nius and Tännsjö claim that the two wordings both express
moral judgments and, hence, that they found a cultural
difference in moral judgments. The idea that the answer
to the question “What ought I to do?” expresses a moral
judgment has a long pedigree in philosophy (Hare, 1952).
However, in everyday language it is possible to judge that
an action is morally permissible and yet think that one
should not do it because of other, non-moral consider-
ations. Since moral judgments are not necessarily “all-
things-considered” judgments, there can be a gap between
what people think is morally right and what they think they
should do. Indeed other research on trolley problems has
found that moral judgments do not map neatly onto judg-
ments about what the agent should do (Gold, Pulford &
Colman, 2014a,b).
Cultural differences might manifest themselves in ei-
ther moral judgments or actions. It is conceivable that
people judge an action to be right and yet, when given
the choice, they would not do it. For instance, behavior
on matters such as vegetarianism and organ donation does
not live up to moral attitudes expressed about those behav-
iors, even among ethicists (Schwitzgebel & Rust, 2013).
As well as the possibility, discussed above, that people
could judge an action as morally desirable and yet think
that they should do something else, there is also the pos-
sibility of weakness of will, where people’s actions do not
correspond to what they think they should do. Tassy, Oul-
lier, Mancini, and Wicker (2013) found discrepancies be-
tween judgments (“Is it acceptable to. . . ”) and predicted
choice (“Would you do. . . ”) in moral dilemmas, with par-
ticipants’ choice of action being more utilitarian than their
judgments.
O’Neill and Petrinovich (1998) reported a preliminary
comparison of US and Taiwanese responses to the ques-
tion “What would you do?” in 25 variations of the trolley
problem. They investigated the effects of varying six di-
mensions of the dilemma: whether it involved taking ac-
tion or inaction, and differences in the numbers of victims
involved, their species, their relationship to the responder,
their status and whether the victims were in the situation
as a result of social agreement, or through no fault of their
own. They reported that the action/inaction, species and
kinship dimensions explained the most variance in both
the US and Taiwanese samples. However, they did not
report any direct comparison of the proportions of US and
Taiwanese participants who favored sacrificing one to save
many in their trolley problems.
Previous experiments on actions in moral dilemmas, in-
cluding O’Neill and Petrinovich (1998), have asked par-
ticipants to predict their own behavior (see also Bar-
tels, 2008; Schaich Borg et al., 2006). Such predictions
have been shown to be notoriously unreliable (Osberg &
Shrauger, 1986; Vallone, Griffin, Lin, & Ross, 1990; Te-
per, Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 2011). For obvious reasons,
it is impossible to operationalize the classic trolley prob-
lem in a real-life laboratory experiment. However, Gold,
Pulford, and Colman (2013) found that substituting eco-
nomic for mortal harms in trolley problems did not affect
the pattern of judgments. In the first experiment reported
here, we operationalize a version of the trolley problem
in which the harms are small but meaningful economic
losses, and we compare the actual choice behavior and
judgments of British and Chinese samples.
2 Experiment 1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
We recruited 45 British participants (21 men and 24
women, mean age = 20.73 years, SD = 3.73), 61 Chi-
nese participants (7 men and 54 women, mean age = 23.69
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Figure 1: Screenshot of ball moving from right to left, on
a collision path with a group of five children.
!
years, SD = 2.20), and 63 other foreign participants who
were not native English speakers (17 men and 46 women,
mean age = 22.62 years, SD = 4.04). Nationality was
classified according to participants’ responses to a stan-
dard demographic question. We also asked our partici-
pants whether they were native English speakers. All the
British were native English speakers, none of the Chinese
was. We discarded the data of six non-Chinese foreigners
who were native English speakers because they were too
small a sample to yield meaningful conclusions. Partici-
pants were recruited through the University of Leicester’s
online e-bulletin, which is sent out to students and staff,
and were paid £5 ($8) for their participation. They were
tested in groups of 15–20.
2.1.2 Procedure and materials
Participants made decisions that influenced the amount
of money that we donated to an orphanage in northern
Uganda (following a similar protocol of Hsu, Anen, &
Quartz, 2008). At the start of the experiment, partici-
pants read a brochure from the Canaan Children’s Home
depicting the children’s plight and showing short biogra-
phies and photos of some of the orphans, matched for age
and gender.
We told the participants that we had endowed each child
whose biography they had read with a sum of money that
would be enough to supply one meal. That amount was
30p (50c), although we described the payoffs to the par-
ticipants in terms of meals rather than cash because of the
far smaller purchasing power of money in Uganda than in
the UK.
Seated at computer monitors, participants then viewed
an animation in which a ball moved slowly across the
screen toward a group of five children, represented by their
photos. On the same screen was a photo of a single child,
not in the path of the ball (see Figure 1). On-screen in-
structions informed the participants that the five children
would lose their meals if the ball continued on its current
path and hit their photos.
Participants had the option to click on a switch that
switched a lever, causing the ball to change direction and
head toward the single child, causing that child to lose its
meal. What we told the participants was true, and we did,
in fact, remove provisionally endowed meals from either
five children or one, according to the participants’ deci-
sions during the experiment, before sending our donation
to the orphanage.
Before participants made their decisions, there were two
demonstrations of the animation, one in which the lever
was switched and one in which it was not. In the demon-
strations, the photos were replaced by blank rectangles,
and the number of rectangles in both groups was always
five. When participants made their decisions, they had
11 seconds during which they could click the switch be-
fore the ball crossed a dotted line in the middle of the
screen. The whole animation took 17.5 seconds. For those
participants who clicked the switch, their decision times
were recorded. Decisions were irreversible and partici-
pants knew this in advance. After making their decisions,
participants judged, on a 9-point Likert scale from 1 (Def-
initely wrong) through 5 (Neutral) to 9 (Definitely right),
“How wrong or right was it to switch the lever?”
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Decisions
We found that 80.00% of British participants but only
49.18% of Chinese participants clicked the switch. These
proportions differ significantly, χ2(1, 106) = 10.47, p =
.001, Cohen’s effect size w = 0.31 (medium). We can con-
trol for any effects of characteristics that are specific to
those who study abroad, including not being a native En-
glish speaker, by using the group of participants who came
from abroad but were not Chinese and who did not speak
English as their native language. We found that 69.35% of
that group clicked the switch, which is significantly differ-
ent from the Chinese, χ2(1, 123) = 5.19, p = .023. In con-
trast, there is no significant difference between that group
and the British, χ2(1, 108) = 1.84, p = .17.
However, a higher proportion of the foreign participants
(both Chinese and non-Chinese) were female, and their
mean age was also higher than the British. In order to
take account of these confounds, we ran a logistic regres-
sion analysis. We found that only the dummy variable for
being Chinese was significant, with Chinese participants
clicking the switch less frequently than British. The model
is shown in Table 1.
When participants clicked the switch, response times
were not significantly affected by nationality, gender, or
age. Our regression model is shown in Table 2.
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Table 1: Logistic regression of clicked (clicked =1, did not
click = 0) with nationality (dummy variables for Chinese,
and other foreign participants who did not speak English
as a native language), gender (male = 0, female = 1), and
age.
B SE Wald p Exp(B )
Chinese 1.65 0.52 10.07 .002 0.19
Other foreign −0.76 0.49 2.43 .119 0.47
Gender 0.34 0.41 0.69 .407 1.41
Age 0.03 0.05 0.39 .531 1.03
(Constant) 0.52 1.20 0.19 .664 1.69
Table 2: Multiple regression of decision response time
(in ms) on nationality (dummy variables for Chinese, and
other foreign participants who did not speak English as a
native language), gender (male = 1, female = 0), and age,
for participants who clicked. (Unstandardized coefficients
are B; standaridze are β.)
B SE β t p
Chinese 458.89 632.81 0.09 0.73 .470
Other foreign 860.70 538.58 0.18 1.60 .113
Gender 87.51 523.63 0.02 0.17 .868
Age 54.77 62.62 0.09 0.88 .384
(Constant) 4497.12 1373.37 3.28 .001
2.2.2 Judgments
A multiple regression analysis reveals that Chinese par-
ticipants gave lower wrong-right judgments, judging the
action to be less right, and older participants gave higher
ratings. There was no significant effect of gender or of be-
ing a non-native English speaker who is not Chinese (see
Table 3).
A striking difference is that 31.15% of the Chinese sam-
ple judged switching the lever Neutral, the modal Chinese
judgment, but only 4.44% of the British sample did so.
This is consistent with previous findings that Chinese and
other East Asians are more likely to use the midpoint of
a rating scale than Westerners (e.g., Chuangsheng, Shin-
Ying, & Stevenson, 1995). Research has suggested that
omitting midpoint response data provides an indication of
what would have been obtained if there had been no mid-
point on the scale (Schuman & Presser, 1981). If we omit
the Neutral responses and group the participants accord-
ing to whether their judgment indicated that switching the
lever was wrong (0–4) or right (6–9), then we find that
69.77% of British but only 47.62% of Chinese participants
Table 3: Multiple regression of wrong-right judgments on
nationality (dummy variables for Chinese, and other for-
eign participants who did not speak English as a native
language), gender (male = 1, female = 0), and age.
B SE β t p
Chinese − 1.44 0.55− 0.27− 2.62 .010
Other foreign− 0.64 0.51− 0.12− 1.25 .212
Gender 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.01 .996
Age 0.21 0.06 0.29 3.70 .000
(Constant) 1.36 1.24 1.10 .273
Table 4: Logistic regression of dichotomous wrong-right
judgments (right = 1, wrong = 0) on nationality (dummy
variables for Chinese, and other foreign participants who
did not speak English as a native language), gender (male
= 1, female = 0), and age.
B SE Wald p Exp(B )
Chinese −1.60 0.59 7.42 .006 0.20
Other foreign −0.46 0.48 0.92 .337 0.63
Gender −0.13 0.44 0.08 .776 0.88
Age 0.21 0.08 6.33 .012 1.23
(Constant) −3.23 1.68 3.69 .055 0.04
judged it right to switch the lever. This difference is sig-
nificant, χ2(1, 85) = 4.30, p= .038, w = 0.23 (small to
medium effect).
Accounting for other demographic variables, as above,
using a logistic regression analysis, we find that age and
being Chinese are both significant predictors of whether
the action was judged as right or wrong, with Chinese be-
ing less likely to judge that the action was right and older
participants being more likely. (Note that the age effect is
positive while the effect of being Chinese is negative, so
age differences cannot account for other observed cultural
differences, as the Chinese participants were older.) See
Table 4 for the model. The percentages in the dichoto-
mous wrong-right judgments of the British and Chinese
are strikingly similar to the percentages of each nationality
who actually switched the lever. A McNemar test reveals
no significant difference between these two dichotomous
distributions, χ2(N = 85) = 0.15, p = .70.
3 Experiment 2
Several criticisms could be made about the results of Ex-
periment 1, which we attempt to control for in Experiment
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2. Firstly, the Chinese participants may have understood
the scenario less clearly even than the other foreign partici-
pants, if English is more difficult for Chinese than for other
nationalities. Therefore in Experiment 2 we had British
and Chinese participants each complete the experiment in
their own native language.
Secondly, the decision in Experiment 1 was taken in
an 11-second time frame, and it is possible that the Chi-
nese participants may just be slower to take moral deci-
sions, which would have resulted in the switch not being
clicked in time and the decision being recorded as being
pro the status quo. To remedy this we used a written sce-
nario, with no time limit, and asked participants what they
“would do” if they were in the experiment. This is the
wording that has been used by previous researchers so, in
order to check our results against those of O’Neill and
Petrinovich (1998), we also included the classic trolley
problem where lives are at stake from an oncoming train.
Thirdly, we wanted to eliminate the possibility that
there was something about the task used in Experiment
1 that interacted with culture and produced different pat-
terns of responses, so we also included a more neutral
gameshow scenario where money is at stake. This allows
us to control for the possibility that we found cultural dif-
ferences in Experiment 1 only because of our use of Ugan-
dan orphans, or because the British were more sceptical
about the details of the situation and were more likely to
believe that all children would get fed fairly by the or-
phanage with the money provided. Comparing the two
scenarios that involve economic harms with the standard
trolley problem also allows us to check whether the cul-
tural difference we found in Experiment 1 was related to
our substitution of economic losses for mortal harms.
In order to investigate the causes of any cultural differ-
ences, we asked participants about their attitude to fate and
administered a Locus of Control scale (IPIP; Goldberg,
1999), and we included an open-ended text box where par-
ticipants could state the reason for their choice of action in
order to discover the thinking behind the decisions.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
We recruited 55 British participants (15 men and 40
women, mean age = 21.11 years, SD = 2.48) and 45 Chi-
nese participants (13 men and 32 women, mean age =
23.73 years, SD = 2.53) in the age range of 18–30 years.
All the British were native English speakers, none of the
Chinese was. Participants were recruited through the Uni-
versity of Leicester’s online e-bulletin, which is sent out
to students and staff.
3.1.2 Translation
The English language version of all materials was trans-
lated into Simplified Chinese by a native Chinese transla-
tor, then back-translated by a different Chinese translator,
and the differences reconciled by a third native Chinese
speaker who was doing a PhD in philosophy in the UK, to
make the Chinese version correspond as closely as possi-
ble to the original English.
3.1.3 Procedure and materials
Participants completed the study on-line in their own time
via a SurveyGizmo site. After reading the consent infor-
mation, they read three scenarios in either English or Chi-
nese. The Orphan scenario was a written description of
the laboratory experiment that we reported as Experiment
1 and also contained an image of the screen as shown in
Figure 1:
Imagine the following scenario: You volun-
teer to take part in a psychology experiment.
You are given a booklet to read with informa-
tion about an orphanage called the Canaan Chil-
dren’s Home in Uganda. This contains photos
and a short biography about some of the poor
children that live there. Then you are told that
the choices that you make in the experiment will
influence real amounts of money that the exper-
imenters will donate to the orphans. The exper-
imenters tell you that they have endowed each
child with a sum of money that would be enough
to supply one meal.
Then you are seated at a computer and watch an
animation in which a ball moves slowly across
the screen toward a group of five children, rep-
resented by their photos. On the same screen is
a photo of a single child, not in the path of the
ball (see Figure below). You are told that the five
children will lose their meals if the ball contin-
ues on its current path and hits their photos.
You are given the option to click on a switch that
moves a lever, causing the ball to change direc-
tion and head toward the single child, causing
that child to lose its meal.
The direction of the ball can be changed by
switching the lever at any time until the ball
passes the dotted line. You have 11 seconds dur-
ing which time you can click the switch to move
the lever before the ball crosses the dotted line.
After reading the scenarios participants were asked:
(1) Would you click the switch to move the lever?
(Yes/No).
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(2) Now please indicate how wrong or how right you
think it would be to switch the lever: (1 Definitely wrong
to 7 Definitely right).
(3) Is it morally wrong for you to switch the lever?
(Yes/No).
(4) Please explain why you decided to move or not
move the lever: (open ended text box).
The Train scenario read:
Imagine the following scenario: You are taking
your daily walk near the train tracks when you
notice that the train that is approaching is out of
control. You see what has happened: the driver
of the train saw five men working on the track
ahead and slammed on the brakes, but the brakes
failed and the driver fainted. The train is moving
so fast that anyone it hits will die immediately.
There are five people working on the main track.
It is obvious that they will not be able to get off
the track in time and, if nothing is done, they
will be killed.
The track has a side-track leading off to the left.
You are standing next to a lever. If you pull the
lever, that will turn the train onto the side track
and the five people on the main track will not
die. But a person is working on the side track. If
the train goes onto the side track, then the person
on the side track will die. You are aware of all
these facts.
Thus, you can pull the lever, in which case the
one person will die but the five people will not;
or you can refrain from pulling the lever, in
which case the five people will die but the one
person will not.
After reading the scenario, participants were asked:
(1) Would you pull the lever? (Yes/No).
Then they received questions (2)–(4) from the Orphan
scenario but switch the lever was replaced with pull the
lever.
The Gameshow scenario read:
Imagine the following scenario: You are a mem-
ber of the studio audience watching a game
show. Five contestants have each earned £100
prize money by answering questions over sev-
eral rounds, and their tokens are nearing the
winning side of the game board. A ball is sud-
denly released and is rolling towards the tokens
of the five contestants and, if nothing is done,
they will be knocked out of the game and lose
their prize money.
You see that a button on your armrest has just lit
up to indicate that you have been randomly se-
lected by computer to take part in the show. You
have the option to press the button and knock
the ball onto another path. But another contes-
tant, who has also earned £100 prize money, has
a token on the new path and will be knocked out
of the game and lose his prize money. You are
aware of all these facts.
Thus you can press the button, in which case the
one contestant will lose his prize money but the
five contestants will not; or you can refrain from
pressing the button, in which case the five con-
testants will lose their prize money but the one
contestant will not.
After reading the scenario, participants were asked:
(1) Would you press the button? (Yes/No).
Then they received questions (2)–(4) from the Orphan
scenario but switch the lever was replaced with press the
button.
After the scenarios were completed participants filled in
demographic information and completed the IPIP 20-item
Locus of Control scale and the following three questions
on a 1 Strongly disagree to 7 Strongly agree scale:
(1) I believe it is usually a good idea to allow things to
run their natural course
(2) I believe that it is usually best not to try to interfere
with the natural course of events
(3) I believe in fate
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Predicted decisions
In the Orphan scenario 90.91% of our British participants
said that they would click the switch to save the five chil-
dren from losing their meals, compared to 73.33% of Chi-
nese (see Figure 2 for percentages for all scenarios, from
both experiments). As in our previous experiment, the
mean age of our Chinese participants was higher than the
British. When we take account of this by running a logistic
regression including demographic variables, we found that
only the dummy variable for being Chinese was signifi-
cant, with Chinese participants being less likely to click
the switch than British. The model is shown in Table 5.
In the Train scenario more British (76.36%) than Chi-
nese (64.44%) participants said that they would pull the
lever to save the lives of the five people. A logistic regres-
sion including demographic variables shows an effect of
nationality, with Chinese participants being less likely to
say that they would move the lever to divert the train, and
a trend for older participants to be more likely to say they
would move it (see Table 5).
The same pattern also showed up in the responses to the
Gameshow scenario, where 63.64% of the British said that
they would press the button to save five contestants from
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Figure 2: Percentage of participants in Experiments 1 and
2 choosing to take the action to save the five.
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losing their money, but only 33.33% of the Chinese would
do this. A logistic regression including demographic vari-
ables confirms that Chinese participants are less likely to
press the button than British in the Gameshow scenario
(see Table 5).
A more powerful test confirms our finding that the
British were more likely to predict that they would take
action than the Chinese. We combined the predictions for
the three scenarios into a composite measure. We scored
each response, as 0 for a “No” and 1 for a “Yes”, and added
each participant’s three scores together, giving a measure
that ranges from 0–3, α = .378. On our composite mea-
sure, British scores (M = 2.31) are higher than Chinese (M
= 1.71), t(74.9) = 3.37, p = .001.
3.2.2 Wrong-right ratings
In the Orphan scenario, there was a significant difference
in the mean wrong-right ratings between British (M =
4.89) and Chinese (M = 4.07), t(98) = 2.60, p = .011.
When we run a multiple regression analysis that includes
demographic variables, thus removing extraneous vari-
ance, it reveals that Chinese participants gave lower rat-
ings, i.e., rated clicking the switch to be less right (see Ta-
ble 6). Unlike our first experiment, there was no effect of
age, but there was an effect of gender, with females rating
the action as less right.
In the Train scenario, there was no difference in the
mean wrong-right ratings between British (M = 4.18) and
Chinese (M = 4.31), t(98) = 0.34, p = .736. Regressions
reveal that there were no cultural differences in ratings, al-
though there was a gender effect, with female participants
giving lower ratings (see Table 6).
In the Gameshow scenario, there was no difference in
Table 5: Logistic regressions of predicted behavior (would
click/ move/ press = 1, would not click/ move/ press =
0) with nationality (dummy variable for Chinese), gender
(male = 0, female = 1), and age.
B SE Wald p Exp(B )
Orphan
Chinese − 1.85 0.71 6.87 .009 0.16
Age 0.20 0.13 2.11 .146 1.22
Gender − 0.36 0.65 0.30 .584 0.70
Constant − 1.45 2.78 0.27 .602 0.23
Train
Chinese − 1.05 0.54 3.82 .051 0.35
Age 0.18 0.10 2.86 .091 1.19
Gender 0.23 0.50 0.21 .645 1.26
Constant − 2.65 2.20 1.45 .228 0.07
Gameshow
Chinese − 1.26 0.48 6.94 .008 0.28
Age 0.00 0.09 0.00 .969 1.00
Gender 0.19 0.47 0.17 .680 1.21
Constant 0.35 1.86 0.04 .851 1.42
the mean wrong-right ratings between British (M = 4.58)
and Chinese (M = 4.22), t(98) = 1.06, p = .292. Regres-
sions show that there were no cultural differences or de-
mographic effects on the numerical wrong-right judgment
(see Table 6).
Analyzing a composite measure, which combines the
responses from all three scenarios, shows an effect of na-
tionality. Since the results from the three scenarios were in
the same direction (even though some were n.s.), we cre-
ated a composite measure, by adding together each par-
ticipant’s three wrong-right ratings. The measure ranges
from 3–21, α = .632. The mean composite ratings for
Chinese (M = 12.6) and British (M = 13.7) do not vary,
t(98) = 1.33, p = .186. However, when we remove extra-
neous variance by including the demographic variables in
a regression, the effects of nationality and gender are both
significant (see Table 6): Chinese and females give lower
ratings.
3.2.3 Moral judgments
There were no cultural differences on our forced choice
question, asking whether or not the action is morally
wrong. In the Orphan scenario, 30.91% of British and
35.56% of Chinese judged that it would be morally wrong
to click the switch, χ2(1, 100) = .242, p = .623. In the
Train scenario, 45.45% of British say ‘Yes’ it was wrong
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Table 6: Multiple regression of wrong-right ratings on na-
tionality (dummy variable for Chinese), gender (male = 0,
female = 1), and age.
B SE β t p
Orphan
Chinese − 0.10 0.34− 0.31− 2.97 .004
Age 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.96 .340
Gender − 1.26 0.33− 0.35− 3.83 .000
Constant 4.60 1.31 3.51 .001
Train
Chinese − 0.20 0.41− 0.05− 0.48 .631
Age 0.12 0.07 0.17 1.60 .113
Gender − 1.37 0.40− 0.33− 3.43 .001
Constant 2.74 1.59 1.73 .087
Gameshow
Chinese − 0.57 0.38− 0.17− 1.48 .142
Age 0.08 0.07 0.13 1.14 .257
Gender − 0.25 0.38− 0.07− 0.65 .518
Constant 3.11 1.50 2.08 .041
Composite
Chinese − 1.76 0.84− 0.22− 2.10 .039
Age 0.25 0.15 0.18 1.68 .097
Gender − 2.87 0.82− 0.33− 3.49 .001
Constant 10.5 3.28 3.19 .020
vs. 35.56% of Chinese, χ2(1, 100) = 1.00, p = .317. In the
Game scenario, 14.55% of British said that pushing the
button would be morally wrong vs. 15.56% of Chinese,
χ2(1, 100) = .020, p = .888.
This pattern is confirmed by a more powerful analysis
of a composite measure. We scored each response, as 0
for a “No” and 1 for a “Yes”, and added each participant’s
three scores together, making a composite measure that
ranges from 0–3, α = .693. On our aggregate measure,
British scores (M = .91) are not significantly different from
Chinese (M = .87), t(98) = .20, p = .842. Despite our
Chinese sample being older than the British, there is a lack
of significant correlation between age and moral judgment
in the raw data and it is possible to confirm this lack of
correlation with a logistic regression analysis (available on
request).
However, the moral judgments are highly correlated
with both the predicted action r(100) = −0.326, p = .001,
and the wrong-right rating, r(100) = −0.514, p < .001.
Participants who judged taking action to be morally wrong
were less likely to predict that they would act and rated
the action as more right. These correlations of the com-
Table 7: Correlations of fate variables with predicted be-
havior (would click/ move/ press = 1, would not click/
move/ press = 0, summed), wrong−right ratings, and
moral judgments (no it would not be morally wrong = 0,
yes it would be morally wrong = 1, summed). N=99 (97
for Fate3 and composite); p = .05 for |r| = .20, .01 for
|r| = .26, .001 for |r| = .36, two tailed.
Predicted
behavior
Wrong−right
rating
Moral
judgment
Composite fate −0.32 −0.38 0.25
Fate1 −0.29 −0.26 0.17
Fate2 −0.35 −0.22 0.20
Fate3 −0.18 −0.39 0.27
posite measures reflect a similar pattern of significant cor-
relations at the level of the individual scenarios (analysis
available on request).
3.2.4 LOC and fate
The Chinese participants agreed much more strongly than
the British participants that things should “run their natural
course” (4.82 vs. 3.83, t(97) = 2.80, p = .006) [fate1], that
it is “best not to try to interfere with the natural course of
events”, (4.49 vs. 3.37, t(97) = 2.98, p = .004) [fate2], and
that they “believe in fate” (4.66 vs. 3.72, t(95) = 2.32, p
= .022) [fate3]. These significant differences all show that
the Chinese on average tend to believe in fate and that it is
best to let events run their course and not intervene (higher
than the mid-point of four on the scale) while the British
do not tend to believe in fate and believe that they should
intervene and not just let things happen. There were no
significant differences in the Locus of Control scores of
British (71.45) and Chinese (70.93) participants, t(97) =
0.26, p = .796.
Responses to the three fate questions were highly cor-
related with each other. A composite variable, which is
the summation of each participant’s three fate question rat-
ings, ranges from 3–21, α = .785. The three fate measures
and the more reliable composite measure are all correlated
with moral judgments and actions (Table 7). Belief in fate
and that one should not take action is associated with a
lower propensity to predict taking action, lower wrong-
right ratings and a higher score on “is it morally wrong?”
3.2.5 Reasons
In all three scenarios, participants who said that they
would take the action overwhelmingly cited utilitarian rea-
sons about the greatest good of the greatest number, such
as “for the greater good”, “the lesser evil”, “the needs of
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the many outweigh the needs of the few”, “to give more
children more food” or “to save more children”. This is
true of both British and Chinese participants.
The reasons given by British and Chinese for not tak-
ing the action differed. In the Orphan scenario five British
people said they would not click the switch. Three cited
unclassifiable reasons, such as feeling sorry for the one
child, or reasons that showed they had misunderstood the
task. Two felt that the whole experimental set-up would
be wrong and that therefore it would be wrong for them
to choose saying, for example, “I think to even have such
a scenario is wrong and would not wish to decide who
should get a meal.” In contrast, of the twelve Chinese par-
ticipants who said that they would not click the switch,
four cited reasons about not having the right to make this
decision, such as “I have not the right to make this kind
of decision”, four cited reasons that we might classify as
a “Kantian” equal respect for persons, such as “every life
is equal to others” and “there is no evidence that 5 kids
are more valuable than 1”, one person said “I don’t want
to change or control anyone’s destiny”, and three were not
possible to classify.
In the Train scenario, thirteen British participants said
that they would not move the lever. The modal British
reason for this, given by six participants, mentioned re-
sponsibility, such as “Did not want the responsibility of
someones [sic] death.” Of the sixteen Chinese participants
who would not move the lever, the modal response, which
was given by five people, cited destiny, fate, or nature;
three of these also cited reasons regarding equal value of
lives, such as “If it happens, it is destiny. It is not evident
to say 5 worth more than 1.” Four cited the fact that mov-
ing the lever would result in a death or a murder, and three
said that they had no right to decide (of whom one also
mentioned the equal value of lives).
In the Gameshow scenario, multiple reasons were gen-
erated. Of the twenty British who would not intervene,
nine said that there were “no serious consequences of
pressing or not pressing the button”; some of these men-
tioned that it was only £100 and others that it was not a
life or death situation. Three said that they did not want
to take part in the gameshow, two mentioned fate, and one
said that that s/he didn’t have any right to take the deci-
sion. In contrast, of the twenty-nine Chinese who said
they would not press the button, six gave reasons that ref-
erenced fate or destiny or its not being their business to
intervene; six said that they did not have the right to inter-
vene, of whom three also mentioned fairness; six said that
there were no serious consequences, six mentioned that it
was only a gameshow; and two mentioned the harm to the
one person who would lose his winnings.
4 Discussion
In our real-life trolley problem (Experiment 1 with or-
phans), the behavior of our British participants mirrored
that of participants in an American virtual reality ex-
periment (Navarette, McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2012),
and their moral judgments were in line with those made
by the (mainly British) participants in hypothetical sce-
narios involving trolley problems associated with eco-
nomic rather than mortal harms (Gold, Pulford, & Col-
man, 2013). However, a much smaller proportion of Chi-
nese than British participants switched the lever, and fewer
Chinese participants judged it to be right to switch the
lever. Chinese participants were much more likely than
British participants to judge this action neutrally, and this
was in fact the modal Chinese judgment. The difference
in propensity to take action and in wrong-right ratings was
replicated in a second experiment using hypothetical sce-
narios, which British and Chinese completed in their own
time and in their own languages. However, in there was
no difference in dichotomous moral judgments of whether
or not the action was morally wrong.
A higher percentage of participants of both nationali-
ties said that they would take action in Experiment 2 than
actually took action in Experiment 1. There was an in-
crease amongst the British groups, from 80% in the real
Orphan scenario to 91% in the hypothetical Orphan sce-
nario, and an increase from 49% to 73% amongst the Chi-
nese. Even if someone predicts that they would sacrifice
one in order to save five, actually implementing that judg-
ment may be more unpleasant and difficult than imagined.
Alternatively, the difference might be due to timing con-
straints, as in Experiment 1 not clicking the switch within
11 seconds was considered to be a ‘No’, or due to dif-
ferences between real and hypothetical decision-making.
The larger increase amongst the Chinese group may also
be because of better comprehension of the dilemma when
it was in their own language. However, the difference be-
tween Chinese and British participants in taking action to
save the five is still large and significant in both real and
hypothetical situations.
In our second experiment, we also used a standard trol-
ley scenario where lives were at stake, and our results con-
firm those of Moore, Lee, Clark and Conway (2011) and
Mikhail (2011), as the Chinese and British participants’
dichotomous moral judgments did not differ in the Train
scenario. However, fewer Chinese than British partici-
pants say they are willing to actually take the required ac-
tion. Across all three scenarios, the Chinese are less likely
to say that they would take action and they rated taking
action as less right than the British, but the two groups’ di-
chotomous judgments did not differ. Given this pattern, it
is not surprising that previous studies did not find cultural
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differences because they only elicited moral judgments,
whilst the main differences occur at the level of behavior.
Although there were no cultural differences in dichoto-
mous moral judgments, judgments were strongly corre-
lated with wrong-right ratings and with behavioural pre-
dictions. Both nationalities, on average, indicated that
taking the action would be right, so the cultural differ-
ence represented a small shift along the “right” side of the
ratings scale. Since the difference does not represent a
shift from “right” to “wrong”, this may explain why there
was no cultural difference on the dichotomous measure of
moral judgment.
Differences in demographics between our British and
Chinese samples do not provide a good explanation of our
results. Our participants were mainly students at a UK
university. As well as having a different nationality, the
Chinese group differed from the British in having chosen
to study abroad and in being non-native English speakers
(although they would have had to satisfy a test of profi-
ciency in spoken and written English as a condition for
admission). However, we controlled for the demographic
confounds in our first experiment by using a group of other
foreign students who were also not native English speak-
ers, and which had very similar demographics to the Chi-
nese group. The slightly higher mean age of both the Chi-
nese and the other foreign group compared to the British
may suggest a larger proportion of post-graduates. The
other foreign group can control for the educational status
of the Chinese, and age will also act as a proxy for status
because number of years of education is correlated with
age. Our control group participants did not make different
decisions or judgments from the British, but they did differ
from the Chinese. We also replicated our results regarding
cultural differences in our second experiment where the
materials were written in Chinese.
Cultural differences in fatalism provide a possible ex-
planation of our results. Embedded in the “Great Tradi-
tion” of Chinese Taoism is a shared belief in fate (ming or
t’ien-ming), interpreted as a force beyond human control
that is chiefly responsible for determining people’s des-
tinies (Eberhard, 1966), and an associated ethical principle
of action through non-action (wu-wei), or allowing events
to take their natural course (Kirkland, 2004). Chinese fa-
talism has roots that can be traced back at least as early as
the 8th century BC, and recent empirical studies have con-
firmed that it persists in contemporary Chinese societies,
often in association with superstitious beliefs about num-
bers and colors, not only in mainland China, but also in
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other overseas territories (Chan,
2000), and even in Chinese communities in California
(Phillips et al., 2001). Our Chinese participants were more
likely to believe in fate, and that they should not intervene
in the natural course of events. This is reflected in the ac-
tual reasons they gave, which tended to mention fate and
destiny, and in the correlation of the answers to our fate
questions with predicted actions, wrong-right ratings, and
moral judgments. Further work would be needed to con-
firm this: a limitation of our design is that we asked sev-
eral questions; the question about belief in fate came after
the questions about non-intervention, which quite closely
reflect the behavioural prediction that participants had al-
ready made, so the answer to the belief in fate question
may have been contaminated by the prior questions and
tasks.
Another possible explanation is that the Chinese and
British differed in whether they thought they were respon-
sible for taking action. Societies prescribe that certain de-
cisions are to be made by particular people, who we might
say have “responsibility” for the decision (Baron, 1996).
With respect to trolley problems, Thomson (1985)
claimed that the driver would be in a special position of re-
sponsibility compared to a passenger; and people’s moral
judgments in trolley problems are correlated with their
judgments about whether the agent is responsible for tak-
ing action (Gold, Pulford, and Colman, 2014b). Amongst
the reasons that our participants gave for saying that they
would not act, “not having the right to intervene” was a
prevalent response from the Chinese. Their reluctance to
act may be exacerbated by the fact that Chinese have more
inter-dependent self-construals, one consequence of which
is that they care more about the opinion of others (Markus
& Kitayama, 1991). The Chinese may have been more
worried about being negatively perceived by others if they
caused harm to someone when taking a decision that they
felt they had no right to make.
The difference in behavior between our British and Chi-
nese samples is clear enough. How the behavioral differ-
ence relates to the difference in moral judgments, on the
other hand, must be interpreted with care.
In our real life Orphan scenario, moral judgments gen-
erally corresponded with actions, and we may indeed have
elicited the moral judgments that underpinned the actions.
However, it is possible that participants were motivated to
report judgments consistent with their actions. This could
result from conscious misreporting, motivated by social
desirability and image management and intended to con-
vey an impression of consistency. Alternatively, partic-
ipants may have reported their judgments truthfully but,
because judgments were elicited after actions, they may
have tended to form judgments that were consistent with
actions previously taken in order to avoid cognitive disso-
nance (Brehm, 1956; Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Stone
& Cooper, 2001). However, the results of Experiment 2
speak against a cognitive dissonance explanation. If dis-
sonance were an issue, then we would expect that a deci-
sion to act would be followed by a judgment that acting
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was not morally wrong. Instead, in the hypothetical Or-
phan and the Train scenarios, strikingly more participants
of both nationalities judged that it would be morally wrong
to act than predicted that they would refrain from acting.
Our findings also raise issues about the consistency
between moral judgments and moral behavior in trolley
problems. Tassy et al. (2013) also found that people’s pre-
dictions of their actions were more utilitarian than their
normative judgments. They hypothesize that the differ-
ence is caused because judgments and choices are re-
sult from (at least partially) different psychological pro-
cesses. We also suspect that our participants did not see
moral considerations as over-riding reasons for action.
Rather, they were only one consideration that could be out-
weighed. But further investigation is needed to say any-
thing definitive about the causes of the difference between
moral judgment and behavior, or the cultural differences
in moral behaviour.
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